

International Planning Studies
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cips20

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Published online: 20 Jun 2013.

To cite this article: Michael Hooper & Jenny Cadstedt (2014) Moving Beyond 'Community' Participation: Perceptions of Renting and the Dynamics of Participation Around Urban Development in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, International Planning Studies, 19:1, 25-44, DOI: 10.1080/13563475.2013.799630

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563475.2013.799630

International Planning Studies, 2014
Vol. 19, No. 1, 25–44, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563475.2013.799630

Moving Beyond 'Community' Participation: Perceptions of Renting and the Dynamics of Participation Around Urban Development in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

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ABSTRACT *This paper employs extensive interviews to examine the ways in which perceptions of renting — on the part of renters, owners and other key actors in the development process — influenced the dynamics of participation around two recent urban development projects in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The study responds to concerns that participatory planning too frequently treats communities as homogenous and overlooks barriers to participation faced by marginalized groups, such as renters. The results show that renters were unwilling and often unable to participate due to perceptions, held by themselves and by others, of renter transience and inconsequentiality. These perceptions led to a cycle of non-participation in which policymakers gave renters' needs little attention in plans and renters were disinclined to participate in mobilization. The results suggest that barriers to renter participation could be reduced if their concerns were proactively given more weight in urban development plans.*

Introduction

Over the last four decades, there has been a growing mainstream interest in participatory approaches to urban planning, both in the developed and developing worlds (Hickey and Mohan 2004; Lane 2005). In the developing world, writing on public participation increased markedly in the mid-1970s as a response, in part, to the work of seminal authors such as Paulo Freire and Myles Horton and the examples set by anti-colonial leaders, including Gandhi in India and Nyerere in Tanzania (Tandon 2008). From this foundation, participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and related approaches became widely used development tools in the 1980s (Binns 1997). By the late 1980s and early 1990s, agencies such as SIDA, USAID and the World Bank had all adopted policies that

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formalized the inclusion of varying degrees of participation in development projects (Tandon 2008). With respect to policy, both UNRISD's Public Participation Program and the 1992 Earth Summit's Agenda 21 action plan served to further introduce participation into urban planning institutions in developing countries (Kapoor 2001; Tandon 2008). Hickey and Mohan (2004, 3) note that since the mid-1980s, participation has 'moved virtually unchecked from the margins to the mainstream of development'. Indeed, Dill (2009, 717) argues: 'the current discourse and practice of international development rest on the assumption that participation is an essential component of efforts to foster sustainable livelihoods, promote good governance and alleviate poverty'.

While participation has become increasingly mainstream, some authors argue that participatory planning practice too frequently treats communities as homogenous and overlooks the impediments to participation faced by marginalized groups. In a key critique, Cooke and Kothari (2001) contend that participation in development projects is often little more than window dressing, granting negligible influence to citizens. Critics also argue that participation efforts often have a limited and unrealistic conception of 'community' that ignores power relations and the social, political and cultural cleavages that divide local residents (Mansuri and Rao 2004).

Tanzania has a long tradition of support for participatory planning efforts. An emphasis on bottom-up approaches towards urban planning and informal settlements is clearly seen in key policy documents, such as the National Human Settlement Policy of 2000 (Government of Tanzania 2000). It is also evident in the country's participation in the UN-initiated Sustainable Cities program, an effort to institutionalize a strategic, bottom-up approach towards urban planning. Dar es Salaam joined the program as a pilot city in the early 1990s and it has since been replicated in other Tanzanian municipalities. As in other countries, there have been strong critiques of the Tanzanian government's approach to participation, claiming that it has changed little on the ground. Authors such as Mercer (2003) and Green (2000) contend that, while policy documents express support for participation, the situation in practice is much more complex and that the poor and other marginalized groups have little influence over policymaking.

As in other regions, renters in African cities are a key group that is often given little consideration in participatory planning efforts. Underappreciated in both planning theory and practice, renters are seldom considered separately from owners in their patterns of mobilization and engagement in developing world cities (Andreasen 1996). This is, in part, due to relatively little research having been done on low-income rental markets, particularly in the developing world (Rakodi 1995; Datta and Jones 2001; Fay and Wellenstein 2005). This is especially surprising in the African context, since renters constitute a large fraction of residents in the continent's cities. Estimates indicate the percentage of renters in African cities averages 31.3%, considerably higher than in other regions of the developing world (UN Habitat 2001). In Tanzania, the 2007 Household Budget Survey documented that 56% of the residents of Dar es Salaam were renters (Government of Tanzania 2009). Estimates for informal settlements in the city, though older than the city-wide figures, are somewhat higher, with 68% of residents counted as renters (Kironde 1995). Nonetheless, in developing country cities, such as Dar es Salaam, renters are frequently an afterthought in urban policy and receive limited consideration from development organizations (Langford and du Plessis 2006; Kumar 2011). For example, in Dar es Salaam, a study by Precht (2005) demonstrates that renters are often ignored in the city's upgrading strategies. Furthermore, in Tanzania, the national

housing policy portrays rental housing as a secondary and inferior solution to the country's widespread housing challenges (Cadstedt 2010).

Noting the gap between the numerical importance of renters in African cities and the relatively limited consideration they often receive from policymakers and planners, this paper evaluates the ways in which perceptions of renting influence the dynamics of participation around urban development projects. A better understanding of how perceptions of renting—on the part of renters, owners and other key actors in the development process — influence renter participation will help refine and target participatory practices, moving beyond 'community' participation to models that take into account the barriers faced by marginalized groups.

In those instances where renters are considered in community participation efforts in African cities, the underlying understanding of renter behaviour is often informed by a relatively narrow focus on economic differences between owners and renters. For example, it is often held in housing policy that the different social attachments and orientations that derive from ownership are a function of individual calculations of economic costs and benefits (Blum and Kingston 1984). In this vein, research shows the higher transaction costs faced by owners when vacating a home and owners' higher levels of financial risk distinguish them behaviourally from renters (Dietz and Haurin 2003). According to this line of thinking, since renters have a lower level of economic investment in property than owners, they have different decision-making criteria and will be less likely than owners to make contributions to infrastructure, social stability and community life. While important, economic considerations represent only one of the ways in which renting is likely to influence behaviour and attitudes.

A smaller literature has suggested that there are other, non-economic, aspects of renting that may affect renter behaviour and life outcomes. These include social-psychological dimensions of renting, such as life satisfaction, self-esteem and social support networks (Rohe and Stewart 1996; Dunn 2005; Rohe, Quercia, and van Zandt 2007; Hulse and Saugeres 2008). While each of these factors might be expected to influence the ability and willingness of renters to engage in community participation efforts around urban development projects, their influence on participatory behaviour has been relatively little studied, especially in the context of developing world cities (Andreasen 1996). Importantly, most studies of home-ownership status and its consequences have relied on general samples of homeowners and have not focused on specific populations (Rohe, Quercia, and van Zandt 2007). While important research by Gilbert (1983) and Gilbert and Ward (1984) revealed that renters are less likely than owners to participate in upgrading activities, these and other authors have been less clear about the mechanisms responsible for these differences. This research steps into this space by studying the ways in which perceptions of renting shaped the dynamics of participation around two urban development projects in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Both projects are exemplars of the kind of urban development projects that are reshaping African cities.

The study's first case focuses on mobilization around expansion of the Port of Dar es Salaam and consequent evictions in the city's Kurasini ward. The second focuses on implementation of the Community Infrastructure Upgrading Program (CIUP) in Sandali ward. While the cases are based in a single city, the findings are applicable in a wide variety of similar contexts. The economic and political forces currently shaping Dar es Salaam — including increasing demand for the marginal land on which the poor live — also influence other cities in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world (Smets

2002). Given that an estimated 62–72% of the urban population of Sub-Saharan Africa resides in slums (UN Habitat 2003; UN 2010), many of which are subject to urban development pressure, the study's findings are widely relevant.[1]

Case 1: Expansion of the Port of Dar es Salaam, Kurasini Ward

The first case centres on mobilization around expansion of the Port of Dar es Salaam and consequent evictions. The expansion project took place in Kurasini ward, which is adjacent to the city's port and home to over 34,500 people (Figure 1). Plans to 'reorganise the land use pattern [of Kurasini] to provide more land for storage of transit goods'



Figure 1. Map showing the location of Tanzania (top left), Dar es Salaam (top right) and the two cases under investigation (bottom). Area number 1 is Kurasini and area number 2 is Sandali. Sources, from top left: Wikimedia Commons; Daniel Dalet (base map from http://d-maps.com); Google and DigitalGlobe GeoEye.

have circulated since 2001, when the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development published the Kurasini Area Redevelopment Plan (Government of Tanzania 2001, iii). In October 2007, the first wave of evictees from Kurasini was ordered to leave their homes. A survey conducted by the authors in Kurasini showed that renters accounted for 79.9% of the area's residents.[2] Following Tanzanian practice, upon eviction property owners received some compensation from the government for lost property while renters received none.[3]

Rather than representing an example of eminent domain, the eviction in Kurasini falls under the rubric of a forced eviction because the process by which the eviction was carried out lacked transparency and was enforced under threat of physical force by government officials. A number of factors highlight the forced nature of the eviction: compensation values were not disclosed until the moments immediately prior to eviction; residents were made to confirm acceptance of their compensation packages before viewing the values on their individual checks; compensation values varied widely between households; compensation was paid in the presence of bulldozers, armed police and police dogs; and physical altercations took place between the police and individuals who questioned the eviction process (Kisembo 2008).

Community mobilization around expansion of the port focused on the evictions that were part of the development plan. The Tanzania Federation of the Urban Poor (TFUP) organized these mobilization efforts. TFUP is associated with Slum Dwellers International, a global network of slum dweller movements, and is built on a nationwide network of 30 community savings groups, accounting for a total of 1700 members (Ndezi 2009). Prior to the eviction, Kurasini was home to 300 TFUP members distributed over seven savings groups. While ostensibly organized around savings activities and the granting of small loans to members, TFUP savings groups also serve as the basis for more political aspects of slum dweller mobilization around local land, water and sanitation issues. In Kurasini, some TFUP members actively participated in efforts to minimize the impacts of evictions in the ward. The principal mobilization effort undertaken by TFUP members in Kurasini was a grassroots enumeration of to-be-evicted neighbourhoods.

Enumerations consist of a population census and comprehensive mapping of plots and households in at-risk communities (Weru 2004). Enumerations demonstrate that marginalized communities have the capacity for self organization, generate data that give a tangible identity to slum residents and serve as the basis for lobbying on behalf of evictees. Accepting the Kurasini eviction would take place, TFUP used the data gathered by members working as enumerators (the name given to those who collected demographic and property data from households and the primary mode of community participation around the eviction) to lobby government for a grant of land for community resettlement (Table 1). TFUP movement organizers attempted to convince authorities in municipal and national agencies responsible for land administration that they should provide a grant of

Table 1. Modes of community participation around urban development in Kurasini and Sandali case studies

Case 1: Kurasini	Case 2: Sandali
Participation as an enumerator	Membership on a CPT Contribution towards CIUP project finances

land to which evictees could move before they were forced to leave their homes in Kurasini. The enumeration was time-consuming and entailed considerable physical risk as enumerators often faced hostile reactions from residents who suspected they were working with government, developers or land speculators.[4] Enumerators also faced political risks, as their efforts sought to influence political processes relating to land and housing allocation, two highly contentious issues in Tanzania (Kironde 1997).

In terms of outcomes, the mobilization activities of TFUP members were unsuccessful in achieving a grant of land for resettlement upon eviction. Although residents who participated as enumerators did collect, collate and disseminate data on their community, their lobbying efforts were unable to influence decision makers and the eviction proceeded as planned. By January 2008, residents began to be evicted from Kurasini and were dispersed to find new homes elsewhere in Dar es Salaam, and beyond, on their own accord. By mid-2008, all residents in the first areas of Kurasini slated for eviction had been evicted and had relocated. Most importantly to this study, renters were found to participate only rarely in mobilization around the Kurasini eviction. Of those TFUP members who participated as enumerators, only 10% were renters. The paper's analytic sections will investigate how perceptions of renting influenced this pattern of participation around expansion of the Port of Dar es Salaam and ensuing evictions.

Case 2: CIUP, Sandali Ward

Initiated in 2005, CIUP aims to improve the lives of Dar es Salaam's low income residents by upgrading services and infrastructure in 31 unplanned areas of the city. A key element of CIUP is its approach, which seeks to 'build community capacity for participating in planning and maintaining infrastructure' (Dar es Salaam City Council 2010, 3). CIUP is financed by the World Bank, by local governments in Dar es Salaam, including Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC), and by the residents of areas to be upgraded.

Implementation of CIUP has been conducted in two phases, the first of which focused on 16 neighbourhoods and was finalized in May 2010. The second phase covered 15 areas and was completed in 2012 (DCC 2010). These focus areas were selected according to a set of criteria established by a consultancy team. The criteria included the presence of high population density and severe environmental problems (Government of Tanzania 2002; DCC 2010). Sandali ward was one of the focus areas selected in the first phase of CIUP. This case study concentrates on one area of Sandali, namely Mkwinda sub-ward (Figure 1). In 2010, Mkwinda had approximately 4700 residents.[5] According to the community upgrading plan for Sandali ward, more than 80% of Mkwinda sub-ward residents were employed in the informal economy (Government of Tanzania 2004). A survey conducted by the authors in Mkwinda showed that renters accounted for 79.5% of the area's residents.[6]

The CIUP infrastructure upgrading project in Sandali sought to undertake a number of targeted improvements to the neighbourhood's urban environment. Upgrading priorities were identified based on a ranking of key issues made by residents at the beginning of the project. The top priority was the limited accessibility of the area, the second was stagnant water, the third was insecurity, the fourth was lack of availability of inhabitable land, and the fifth was inadequate solid waste disposal (Government of Tanzania 2004).

CIUP was intended to incorporate community participation in two ways (Table 1). First, residents were expected to make a financial contribution to the program. Communities were to pay 5% of the costs for upgraded infrastructure. The rationale for including this element of financial participation was that it would lead to community ownership and enhanced project sustainability (DCC 2010). Community residents could also participate by electing representatives to community planning teams (CPTs) and by attending meetings about the project. CPTs were intended to represent the community in all aspects of the project. They were responsible for coordinating activities and informing and teaching residents about the project and about health, hygiene and environmental issues (DCC 2010). CPTs were structured so as to 'ensure that there [was] adequate representation at ... local levels ... and that gender [was] well balanced' (DCC 2010, 6). For purposes of electing CPT members, the sub-ward was divided into four zones, in each of which residents elected two representatives (one man and one woman). According to project documentation, 2–3% of residents attended the meetings where CPT representatives were elected (Government of Tanzania 2004).

In terms of outcomes, the most significant physical result of the project was the successful construction of new infrastructure in Sandali. Interviewed residents and other actors, including government officials and representatives of civil society, reported that new roads made it easier to transport people to hospital. They also reported that the drainage system was improved, flooding decreased and the area became safer due to installation of street lights. In terms of renter participation, no renters were members of the Mkwinda CPT and considerable confusion concerning the financial role of renters in CIUP was reported by interviewees of all types. As with the Kurasini case, the paper's analytic sections will investigate how perceptions of renting influenced the dynamics of participation surrounding the project.

Data and Methodology

The two cases were selected because they are exemplars of the types of urban development projects taking place across much of urban Africa. As described, the first case, in Kurasini ward, focuses on mobilization around expansion of the Port of Dar es Salaam and resulting evictions. The second case investigates a government-led urban development and local infrastructure upgrading program. While different in type and scale, the two projects share important characteristics. Both cases are, in part, the result of financial investment by forces outside the local community and represent decisions on the part of government authorities to transform the urban landscape. Both cases are among the best known examples of these types of projects in Dar es Salaam in recent years and thus serve as useful lenses through which renting and urban development may be analysed and understood. In both cases, the participatory processes under investigation were the primary means by which residents engaged with structures of power around these urban development projects, making them particularly well suited to understanding the dynamics of renter participation.

Interviews were conducted with stakeholders in both cases, including local renters and owners and government officials (Table 2). In the Kurasini case, interviews were also conducted with community organizers, academics and employees of international agencies working on housing and land use. As well, key project documents associated with both

Table 2. Data sources for Kurasini and Sandali case studies

Sources of data	Case 1: Kurasini	Case 2: Sandali
Interviews	81 residents (23 renters, 58 owners) 5 community organizers 3 local government officials 1 national government official 2 international organization employees 7 academics	42 residents (27 renters, 15 owners) 5 local government officials
Other sources	Core project documents Related planning documentation Newspaper accounts	Core project documents Related planning documentation

cases were collected in the course of fieldwork to provide a window onto the way in which renters were addressed in planning documents.

For the first case, interviews were conducted with 81 residents of the neighbourhood adjacent to the Port of Dar es Salaam in Kurasini ward. These interviews were conducted between August 2007 and July 2008. Interviewees included 23 renters and 58 owners as well as key actors from civil society and local and national government. Resident interviewees were selected due to their membership in TFUP. All TFUP members who participated as enumerators — the primary form of local participation that emerged in response to port expansion and consequent evictions — were interviewed, while a random sample of those who did not were interviewed. In total, 41 enumerators and 40 non-enumerators were interviewed. While TFUP served as a valuable source of interviewees in a neighbourhood undergoing intense change, it is possible that selecting interviewees based on their membership may have introduced some selection bias. Mitigating against this possible source of error is the fact that TFUP members include a wide range of resident types (including members of different genders, religions, ethnic groups and ages).

For the second case, data was collected on CIUP in Sandali during a three-week qualitative fieldwork period in January and February 2011. Interviews were conducted with 42 residents of Mkwinda sub-ward, including 27 renters and 15 owners. Interviewees were strategically selected to include: new and long-standing renters, new and long-standing owners, and women and men. Members of these groups were chosen as interviewees because these categories represent key stakeholders in communities affected by CIUP. Prospective interviewees were identified by conducting reconnaissance walks of the neighbourhood at different times of day with assistance also provided by local community leaders. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with informants from government departments.

Analytically, our approach involved examining our extensive interview transcripts for themes that related to renter participation and which could help us understand the patterns of participation observed in our two cases. To highlight the themes that did emerge, we selected representative quotes that captured the sentiments of interviewees. In some cases we also tallied the qualitative responses to allow us to conduct basic statistical tests. In this way we could identify trends in the responses and differences between interviewee groups.

The data presented for the Kurasini case has, in part, been reported elsewhere (Hooper and Ortolano 2012). This paper expands on the previously published account by presenting

the Kurasini case in a comparative perspective and evaluating it specifically with the goal of understanding the dynamics of renter participation around urban development. In this respect, the analysis presented here represents a unique contribution. Furthermore, the topic addressed by the second case, renter participation in CIUP, has not been previously documented in the peer-review literature and therefore represents a novel contribution.

Results and Discussion

The data collected through field interviews was analysed qualitatively to identify key themes that might account for patterns in renters' individual willingness and ability to engage in community participation around urban development in Dar es Salaam. It was found that virtually all actors — whether local renters or owners or other players in the policymaking process — either directly stated or revealed through their actions that renters were viewed as transient and inconsequential. As described in the following section, these two narratives were by the far the most frequent themes in the interview transcripts and dominated all others. While we cannot rule out the involvement of other factors and do not have the detailed demographic and social data that could serve as quantitative controls, the evidence from our field interviews suggests that perceptions of renter transience and inconsequentiality were important factors in shaping patterns of renter participation. As we will describe, on the part of policymakers these perceptions led to renters' interests being largely ignored in development plans. In turn, this reinforced renters' own disinclination to participate. The outcome of this cycle of non-participation was an equilibrium in which policymakers paid little heed to renter interests and renters seldom engaged in public participation around urban development.

Transience

In Kurasini, the perception of renters as transient was held by renters and owners as well as by other key actors, including representatives from government and civil society. Interviewees frequently mentioned that renters were only temporary residents of the community and 'temporary stayers' was a phrase frequently applied to renters. As an example of this sentiment, an owner stated: 'Renters are only temporary stayers who will move on soon to somewhere else'. Likewise, a renter said: 'Renters are seen, and see themselves, as temporary residents'. These narrative accounts provide an interesting counterpoint to quantitative data collected on renter versus owner duration of residence in the community. Interviewed renters had lived in Kurasini for an average of 13.6 years, as compared with an average of 20.5 years for owners. While these values clearly show that owners had, on average, lived in Kurasini longer than renters, they also indicate that renters were far from temporary residents.

In Kurasini, interviewees mentioned that renters' perceived transience led to a lack of connection to place. Interviewees frequently stated that this lack of connection to place in turn produced a limited willingness on the part of renters to participate in community mobilization. As representative of these sentiments, an owner remarked: 'Tenants think they will leave at any time. They are, therefore, less concerned with the community'. Similarly, a renter stated: 'Tenants are temporary stayers, so they feel they are less responsible for the community and are less likely to participate'.

The perception that renters were transient and, thus, had limited inclination and willingness to participate in mobilization was also held by local and national government officials. A local government planner remarked that, 'Renters don't stay in the settlement for long and therefore don't feel an attachment. They are unlikely to participate'. A representative of the national Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development similarly stated: 'Renters don't participate and it's not worth counting on their participation. They move frequently and aren't connected to any one place.' Reinforcing these comments, a government official working on local planning issues said: 'Renters are so transient that it's too difficult to plan for them. They don't participate because they just live in a place temporarily.' These comments suggest the sentiment that renters were transient and unconnected to their community was widespread, not only among local owners and renters, but also among policymakers responsible for human settlement planning.

Supporting these accounts of perceived renter transience and limited connection to place, owners were significantly more likely than renters to consider Kurasini their 'home'. Sixty-four per cent of owners considered their local settlement to be 'home', as compared with 35% of renters. This difference was statistically significant at the 95% level (T-test; $p = 0.018$).

In Sandali, as in Kurasini, renters were held by interviewees to be 'temporary stayers'. Although renters were reported to have lived for many years in the same house and even longer in the area, they were not perceived as permanent residents, either by themselves or others. This perception was reflected in the way in which membership in CPTs was constituted and in discussions concerning residents' financial contributions to CIUP.

Interviews concerning membership in CPTs revealed that perceptions of renter transience influenced whether renters were seen as appropriate members of these representative bodies and that deep confusion surrounded the role of renters in CIUP. According to the Sandali ward councillor, membership was open to renters and was not contingent on house ownership.[7] In contrast, the municipal CIUP coordinator stated that house ownership was a requirement to serve on the CPT. His rationale overlapped with the narrative of renter transience and limited connection to place recorded in Kurasini. Renters were to be excluded, he argued, because it would be problematic if they moved after serving only a short time in their elected position. A similar confusion concerning the ability of renters to participate in the CPTs was observed in interviews with serving CPT members. Some members of the Mkwinda CPT reported that they believed renters could not be representatives because members had to be 'permanent residents'. Similar sentiments were expressed in another group interview, where CPT members argued that renters could not serve as representatives because they had to be 'readily available'. Perhaps as a consequence of these opinions concerning renter transience, no renters were members of the Mkwinda CPT.

Other interviewees, as well as official project documentation, expressed confusion concerning the role of renters in CIUP when it came to discussions of financial contributions. Some interviewees advanced the opinion that renters were temporary residents and therefore should not, or were unlikely to, pay into the program. For example, in a group discussion with CPT members in Mkwinda one member reasoned that, for the purposes of project financial contributions, tenants are not permanent residents of the community. Other renters expressed similar sentiments, mentioning that, while they would like to make contributions, this was difficult as they were too transient. Some interviewees noted that renters were transient but should nonetheless contribute. In one instance, a CPT member and owner remarked that renters should not be 'left behind' in the project

because they 'stay in our houses' and ultimately benefit from CIUP-led development. As with the issue of CPT participation, a fundamental confusion concerning the place of renters in urban development pervaded interviewee responses. A clear theme in the interview narratives was that renters were seen by many people, including many renters themselves, as transient members of the community with limited connection to place and therefore subject to different obligations and responsibilities than owners.

The concept of 'loyalty' from Hirschman's (1970) Exit-Voice-Loyalty model provides a possible theoretical explanation for the more frequent participation of owners in the two cases. This model coincides closely with the results outlined above and serves as a useful framework for understanding how renters' perceived transience led to lower levels of participation than for owners. In his model, Hirschman argues there are two avenues by which people may address the declining performance of a firm, organization or state. These are by abandoning it, known as 'exit', or by acting upon complaints and concerns to promote change, known as 'voice'. Hirschman notes that when people are more 'loyal' they are more likely to choose voice, even when the costs are high.

Hirschman (1970, 77) defines loyalty as a 'special attachment to an organization'. In a spatial context, the concept of loyalty is similar to the idea of connection to place. In this study, owners — who were considered by interviewees to be less transient and to have greater connection to place than renters — were significantly more likely to participate in mobilization around urban development projects. This parallels the logic developed by Hirschman regarding the effects of loyalty on the likelihood of pursuing voice. In Hirschman's model, loyalty increases the likelihood of pursuing voice by effectively reducing the perceived costs of this course of action. The model suggests that perceptions that renters were transient and lacked connection to place may have increased the relative cost of pursuing voice and reduced the likelihood that renters would choose this course of action.

These aforementioned results also dovetail with, and extend, existing research on the effect of mobility on community participation. Research on organizational involvement shows that residential stability is associated with greater civic engagement (Putnam 1995). The findings from the two cases investigated here suggest that perceptions of transience, in addition to actual transience, may also have a profound impact on individuals' willingness and ability to participate in community mobilization efforts.

Inconsequentiality

The second dimension of renting that negatively influenced renters' willingness to engage in community participation around urban development was a perception of inconsequentiality and inability to effect change. Both owners and renters reported a strong perception that renters are of little consequence to urban development and that the planning system does not respond to their needs.

In Kurasini, the inconsequentiality of renters was a strong theme in interviewee accounts of urban development. As a renter concluded: 'Tenants count for nothing in whole process, so people don't include them. It's assumed they're unimportant to these issues — by the city, owners, and tenants.' In Kurasini, renters' diminished belief in their efficacy of action was listed by 43% of interviewees as being an important reason for their lower rates of participation in mobilization around urban development.

In Kurasini, interviewees frequently commented that owners were more likely to 'expect a response from government'. For instance, an owner remarked: 'Renters have less confidence in benefits coming. They see [participation] as a burden and don't see how they'll benefit.' Likewise, a renter contended: 'Tenants are worried about whether their voices will be heard so are unwilling to put in time to local efforts.' And, more directly, another renter said: 'Renters will think they're wasting their time.'

The perception of renter inconsequentiality was also held by policymakers. Local government officials remarked that renters were not 'full' members of the community and therefore did not need to be taken into account in planning. Interviewed local officials also argued that it was unnecessary to compensate Kurasini renters in the case of eviction because renters were 'less important' than owners. In interviews, the narrative surrounding renters on the part of officials was frequently one of less than complete citizenship and of a group that was of little consequence to development plans.

In Sandali, the perception of renters as inconsequential could be seen in both the lack of renter inclusion in CPTs and in the treatment of renters in plans for community financial contributions to CIUP. The CIUP Community Upgrading Plan shows a clear preference for owners over renters in its interpretation of how finances are to be contributed to the project. The plan states: 'The community will pay an upfront cash contribution of Tsh. 30,000 per house-owner' (Government of Tanzania 2004, 16). This suggests that those residents considered full members of the community for the purposes of CIUP, at least in the context of financial participation, were house owners.

Expanding on these official sentiments concerning renters' role in financing the project, the CIUP municipal coordinator noted in an interview that the reason for using houses as the unit of financial contribution was that information existed on the number of houses in the area but not on the number of either households or renters. The lack of estimates of the renter population in the project area alludes to the inconsequential role of renters in CIUP. The coordinator also argued that it was difficult to convince renters to pay because they already pay rent to owners and would inevitably question why they should also pay for the project, especially if the upgrading might lead to increased rents. However, he also stated that renters were nonetheless included in the process because some renters had contributed financially and, in some houses with absent landlords, the renters had played an important role by informing the owner of the need to contribute. The ward councillor for the area also stated that the reason for requiring contributions per house and not per household was that all houses, but not all households, were registered. However, taking a slightly different perspective from the CIUP coordinator, he stated it was the responsibility of each house owner to get renters to contribute because an owner knows how many households there are in any given house.[8] As these diverse and contradictory accounts reveal, considerable confusion existed among CIUP and local officials concerning the ways in which renters were thought to be able and willing to make financial contributions to the project. However, one constant was that renters' participation in the program was generally an afterthought to that of owners.

The perception of renters as inconsequential was also highlighted by the way in which the collection of community financial contributions was actually implemented. For example, the chairperson of Mkwinda sub-ward mentioned in an interview that many owners could not afford to pay 30,000 TSh (the basic contribution) by themselves and, as a result, renters would have to pay as well.[9] He remarked that they implemented this system in his area and that it was not difficult to get renters to pay. As this shows,

renter participation was an afterthought and was introduced to make up for a shortfall in project finances. In discussions with CPT members, these community representatives stated that, while contributions were originally intended be 30,000 TSh per house, this was later adjusted to include renters at a charge of 2500 TSh per adult. CPT members reported that, in response to this change, some renters paid while others did not. Again, these accounts speak to a deep confusion concerning the role of renters in urban development projects and highlight that even where renters were included, it was often as an afterthought and not as an effort to respond to the needs or interests of renters themselves.

The fundamental confusion amongst CIUP and local officials concerning the role of renters suggests that little thought was given to their place in the program. From among the different perspectives on the role of renters in CIUP finances one constant emerges across virtually all interviewees: that renters were seen as subordinate to owners and inconsequential to the wider functioning of CIUP. Perhaps most tellingly, however, the inconsequential role of tenants in CIUP is revealed in project documentation that reports that a key economic benefit of the project is to be 'A notable increase in the value of land and properties ... ' (DCC 2010, 13). Nowhere is it noted that such increases in land value might not benefit renters, who would likely see their rents increase as a result.

A Cycle of Renter Non-Participation

The results of this study suggest that widely held perceptions of renter transience and inconsequentiality led to a cycle of renter non-participation around urban development in Dar es Salaam. As indicated in the previous section, field interviews show that these perceptions led policymakers to give limited consideration to renter needs in the development of plans (Figure 2). In turn, this reinforced renters' disinclination to participate and further entrenched deeply held perceptions of their own transience and inconsequentiality. The result of this cycle was an equilibrium in which renters seldom participated in mobilization and policymakers gave their needs little attention in plans for urban development. Such an outcome is problematic in a policy environment where, at least on paper,



Figure 2. Cycle of renter non-participation associated with urban development projects in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

community participation is given very high priority. For example, the National Human Settlement Policy of 2000 (Government of Tanzania 2000, 27) includes as a main objective the 'participation of ... communities in planning, development and management of human settlements'. In this context, the very limited renter participation around these two development cases represents a major oversight.

While interviewee narratives provide a strong account of the perceptions at the heart of this cycle, they give less indication of why renters, owners and decision makers felt so strongly that renters were inconsequential with respect to urban development and transient. These sentiments are, as mentioned, all the more surprising in light of renters' often long-standing residence in both communities. When told that renters had, on average, lived in Kurasini for more than a decade, many interviewees found this hard to believe. When asked to account for why renters were seen as transient, people generally reverted to the argument that they were 'temporary stayers' in the community. This kind of tautological reasoning emphasizes the power of interviewees' conviction that renters are ultimately transient, irrespective of their actual duration of residence. Nonetheless, renters' detailed personal stories confirmed to the authors that they had indeed lived for many years in their neighbourhoods. While it is not possible to say precisely why actors held their widely shared perspectives on renters, it is clear from interviewee narratives that the perceptions of renter transience and inconsequentiality held by different actors were mutually reinforcing, a point we will examine in more detail.

The cycle of renter non-participation observed in Dar es Salaam can be better understood by examining personal and theoretical perspectives on efficacy of action. From a personal standpoint, interviewees in Kurasini frequently contended that owners had greater belief in the efficacy of their action because policymakers listened to their needs. Interviewees argued that owners were compensated (albeit modestly) in the eviction process and that this indicated the government took their claims seriously. Renters' claims, interviewees argued, were not taken seriously, as evidenced by the lack of compensation they received in Kurasini. As a result, participation would be fruitless. For instance, an owner stated: 'Renters don't get compensation so have less faith in the government. Renters have less confidence. They are fed up'. Elaborating on renters' feeling of inability to effect change, a renter commented on the compensation process, saying:

> Tenants are regarded as less important, by renters and owners in Tanzanian society. The government also thinks this and tenants know this, which affects confidence. Tenants don't think they have value.

In Sandali, interviewees' narratives suggest that non-responsiveness from planners and policymakers likewise led to diminished renter participation. As seen with renter involvement in CPTs, when renters' conditions and interests were not reflected in development plans renters were unlikely to participate. When renters were absent from CPTs, either because they did not find them relevant or because they were prevented from joining, these representative bodies were also more likely to reflect the interests of owners and lack renter perspectives. As in Kurasini, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the way in which plans consider renters and their interests (or fail to do so) and patterns of renter participation around urban development projects.

The work of Hirschman (1970) provides a helpful theoretical lense through which to better understand the origins of this cycle and its resulting renter non-participation equilibrium. Hirschman argues that the likelihood of people voicing their complaints and acting on their concerns depends on the influence they believe they have and on positive past experiences with exercising voice. In the cases studied here, many interviewees argued that renters did not participate because of perceptions, on both their and policymakers' part, that renters' interests and concerns were of little consequence. According to interviewees, the past experiences of owner and renters — expected in Hirschman's logic to be at least partly determinative of an individual's willingness and ability to choose voice — were radically different. In Kurasini, owners were compensated for their losses and renters were not. In Sandali, owners were considered full players in CPTs and in CIUP financial arrangements and renters were not. According to Hirschman, these very different experiences with past opportunities for exercising voice would influence the future likelihood of owners and renters engaging in participation efforts.

Identification of a cyclic relationship between the treatment of renters in plans and the willingness of renters to participate in community mobilization appears to be a specific instance of a broader, theoretical phenomenon identified by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2008). In experiments they conducted, those authors found that whether individuals had 'voice' in a given scenario was less important than seeing evidence that their voice mattered. In Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's experiments, when individuals were provided with evidence that their positions were taken into consideration in decision making, perceptions of procedural and outcome fairness increased as did willingness to comply with those decision. In a similar vein, interviewees in Kurasini and Sandali argued that, while broad policies existed that provided them with theoretical opportunities to contribute to urban development decisions, they saw no evidence that their opinions, perspectives or concerns were listened to or incorporated into actual plans. This suggests that a possible avenue for increasing the participation of renters in urban development in Dar es Salaam, and similar contexts, would be for planners and policymakers to pre-emptively and publicly take action to address renter concerns and actively engage their interests in development plans.

As outlined at the outset of this paper, there has been relatively limited consideration of renters in the literature around urban planning in developing world cities (Kumar 2011). As evidenced in Kurasini and Sandali, renters are sometimes also often given little consideration in practice. We postulate that one reason for this is that the practices of development institutions reinforce each other and, where they give short shrift to renters, may work to establish a normative framework in which renters' interests and concerns are paid little attention. The field of international development is a relatively narrow one, dominated by a few actors whose practices and approaches can quickly become internalized (Chabbott 1998). Witness the rapid assimilation of participatory language in development discourse and the speedy adoption of the Millennium Development Goals as an organizing framework for development practice, to name just two examples. Normative ideas, such as these, are defined as being shared by actors in a field and consisting of taken-for-granted assumptions about values, attitudes, identities and other 'collectively shared expectations' (Katzenstein 1996). Importantly, processes of institutional isomorphism, where organizations emulate each other to gain legitimacy, can work to further entrench normative ideas (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), including those held about renters. As this study shows, actors such as

the Government of Tanzania can achieve considerable legitimacy without deeply considering renters in the mechanics of urban development plans and appear to face little isomorphic pressure to include renters in their models of community participation.

At first glance, the options for breaking the cycle of renter non-participation seem limited. Indeed, looking at the literature on political culture, it can be observed that policymakers' options are often constrained by their taken-for-granted worldviews (Campbell 2002). Functionally, these shared cognitive paradigms limit the options perceived as available to decision makers. As we have documented in Dar es Salaam, decision makers at a variety of levels viewed renters as transient and inconsequential and were hesitant to take their interests into account. Fortunately, research suggests that policy changes in an environment where normative ideas dominate can be instigated by new programmatic ideas. Programmatic ideas are 'the precise causal (i.e. cognitive) ideas that facilitate policy making among elites by specifying how to solve particular policy problems' (Campbell 2002, 28). Programmatic ideas often arise from critical epistemic communities whose claims to knowledge and expertise enables them to be heard above other voices. For example, intellectuals were critical players in promoting early ideas about how European and North American welfare states might be established (Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1996). The idea that emergent programmatic ideas can challenge dominant norms parallels the logic developed by Brooks (2005), which shows that 'peer dynamics' powerfully influence the diffusion of new policy models.

To break the current cycle of renter non-participation, key actors could strategically act as first movers to demonstrate that renters' interests and concerns should be taken seriously by policymakers and in urban development plans. In doing so, they have the potential to advance new programmatic ideas concerning renting and establish new normative frames of reference for the role of renters in urban development. Building on the work of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2008), renters will need to see more evidence that their needs are being addressed before they are likely to participate in participation and mobilization efforts. Proactive introduction of new programmatic ideas by leaders in the epistemic community shaping urban development policy has a strong chance of achieving this goal.

To establish a new equilibrium, wherein the silent majority in cities like Dar es Salaam would be willing to participate around urban development projects, actors such as the World Bank and United Nations — key actors in the epistemic community central to international urban development policy — could take simple first steps. These include working to ensure that major urban development projects funded and supported by these agencies take renters into account. At the moment, as the Kurasini and Sandali cases reveal, renters and their needs are often an afterthought. By working with key governments to establish new norms around the engagement of renters in urban development, actors such as the World Bank and United Nations could try to establish new models for emulation. Examples include working with project officials to ensure that renters are taken into account in project planning, that confusion surrounding treatment of renters is minimized and that biases concerning renter transience and inconsequentiality are not promulgated by project leadership. Just in the way that current norms, which as seen in Dar es Salaam often leave renters out of the urban development equation, are liable to be copied by other governments and policymakers, these new renter-friendly practices could become the basis for processes of isomorphic mimicry and the foundation for more inclusive models of community participation.

Conclusion

In the growing discourse on community participation, the term 'community' is often treated in an overly simplistic manner and renters and other marginalized groups are sometimes given insufficient consideration. This paper responds to the stark disconnect between the numerical importance of renters in African cities and the limited attention they often receive in urban development plans by examining the ways in which perceptions of renting influence the dynamics of participation around urban development projects.

In two urban development case studies investigated in Dar es Salaam, renters were found to seldom participate in mobilization activities. Renters were often unwilling and unable to participate due to perceptions, held by others and themselves, of renter transience and inconsequentiality. With respect to the results for transience, it is important to highlight that, while renters had lived in both communities for less time than owners, they were still, on average, long-time residents and not transient in any normal use of the word. Hirschman's (1970) Exit-Voice-Loyalty model provides a theoretical framework for interpreting the paper's findings with respect to transience, suggesting that perceptions of transience may increase the relative cost of pursuing voice. The results also confirm and extend evidence provided in other contexts that mobility is a barrier to civic engagement (Putnam 1995). The evidence from Kurasini and Sandali suggests that it is not only absolute transience that can have a dampening effect on willingness and ability to participate, but also perceptions of transience.

Perceptions of renter inconsequentiality were widely held — by owners, renters and other key actors in the urban development process. In Sandali, the influence of these perceptions was seen in the way that renters were left out of CPTs and in the deep confusion that surrounded the participation of renters in financial contributions to CIUP. Where renters were included in the Sandali case, it was generally as an afterthought. In Kurasini, renters, owners and policymakers recounted a deep sense that renters' interests and needs were of little importance and were given little consideration in urban development.

The interview data suggests that perceptions of renter transience and inconsequentiality led to a cycle of renter non-participation. The outcome of this cycle was an equilibrium in which renters were disinclined to participate in mobilization and policymakers gave their needs little attention in plans for urban development. This cycle appears to be a specific example of a phenomenon identified experimentally by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2008). In their research, opportunity for voice was shown to be insufficient to generate perceptions of procedural fairness. In the case of Tanzania, opportunities often exist in the abstract for community participation, in that national policies provide broad support for participation. However, as seen in the two cases investigated here, these theoretical opportunities for voice do not necessarily translate into real inclusion of renters in development plans. These results suggest an important set of policy and planning changes that could be implemented to increase renter engagement and participation in urban development projects.

The results of this study suggest that barriers to renter participation could potentially be reduced if renters' concerns were proactively given more weight by policymakers. This would need to be done pre-emptively, in a way that clearly demonstrated to renters that their concerns, perspectives and opinions were in fact taken seriously. This could possibly

break the observed cycle of renter non-participation and move towards the kinds of broadly inclusive participatory programs that urban upgrading policies typically call for. Establishing clarity around the role of renters in urban development projects would be a strong first step in this direction. As demonstrated in the two cases studied herein, policymakers and planners were often confused about the way in which renters and their needs should be reflected in plans. Furthermore, renters often received contradictory and competing signals from officials about the obligations and benefits associated with urban development. One important avenue for conveying to renters that they are important to urban development would be for agencies that play a key role in shaping international urban development norms, such as the World Bank and United Nations, to take a proactive role in better considering renters in the projects and programs they support and, at the very least, ensuring greater clarity around the place of renters in urban development plans. Such steps could reduce the stigma of renting and enhance the profile of renters in the dominant discourse on community participation.

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by funds provided to Michael Hooper through a Doctoral Fellowship from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). Funding was also provided to Michael Hooper through a Goldsmith Fellowship from the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation (SCICN) and by grants from Stanford's Emmett Interdisciplinary Program in Environment and Resources, the Stanford Center for Philanthropy and Civil Society and the American Planning Association. Funding was provided to Jenny Cadstedt by the Nordic Africa Institute, where she was employed during the time of the study.

Notes

1. Reliable estimates of the percentage of the population of sub-Saharan Africa living in slums or informal settlements are difficult to obtain and should be interpreted with care, as they often aggregate data across multiple statistical regimes. Nonetheless, the point stands that a large proportion of the urban population in the region lives in informal settlements. Estimates cited in the text are as follows: UN Habitat (2003) (72%) and UN (2010) (62%).
2. This survey was conducted in April 2013 and included 289 households sampled over 100 randomly selected properties.
3. All compensation values reported by evictees in the course of interviews for this study, or in the mainstream Tanzanian media, were between 8 and 12 million Tanzanian shillings (TSh) (equivalent to US$4989–7483 as converted using www.xe.com on 18 January 2013).
4. Mwanakombo Mkanga, Deputy Director, Centre for Community Initiatives, personal communication. Interviewed 10 August 2007 at Mivinjeni, Kurasini ward, Dar es Salaam.
5. Ward Executive Officer (a salaried, ward-level local government official), personal communication. Interviewed in January 2011 in Dar es Salaam.
6. This survey was conducted in April 2013 and included 283 households sampled over 100 randomly selected properties.
7. Ward councillors are elected representatives at the ward level. The ward is the second lowest tier in the formal national administrative hierarchy (Lameck 2011).
8. Ward councillor, personal communication. Interviewed January 2011 in Dar es Salaam.
9. Sub-ward chairpersons are representatives of elected local committees at the sub-ward level. The sub-ward is the lowest tier in the formal national administrative hierarchy (Lameck 2011).

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